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difference (in terms of content) from the DCFR itself is that the individual PEL volumes
contain comparative introductions to individual chapters and translations of the Articles
themselves fromEnglish into the other 16 languages of theMember States. In this volume such
introductions are provided for the first three chapters (“Fundamental provisions”, “Legally
relevant damage”, “Accountability”), though not for subsequent chapters (on “Causation”,
“Defences”, “Remedies” or “Ancillary rules”). In his Foreword to this volume, Professor von
Bar also notes more generally that there are “occasionally small discrepancies between the
model rules published in this series and those of the Draft Common Frame of Reference” (xi),
explained by him as primarily a consequence of the PEL volumes having been conceived as
self-contained treatments, and also because the drafting of the final DCFR text was able to
take account of earlier criticisms made of the model rules in the PEL series (the relationship of
the PEL to the history of the DCFR project is also narrated at paras 45-47 of the Introduction
in volume 1 of the DCFR itself).
Although the PEL volumes are far from inexpensive, they provide to a very limited extent
a (relatively) more affordable way of acquiring select parts of the full DCFR with commentary
than purchasing the DCFR itself, which few are likely even to consider, given its exceptionally
high price of £750. That said, the DCFR edition is still better value than it would be to
purchase all the PEL volumes individually, and the reality is that the marketing of both the
DCFR and PEL seems to be directed towards institutional purchase. However, even for
institutional purchase these prices are high. The marketing and publishing strategy behind the
wider dissemination of the DCFR thus seems puzzling, except perhaps from the commercial
point of view of the publishers. It is surely legitimate to feel some consternation about this.
This reviewer has not tried to establish whether there are any of the occasional “small
discrepancies” between the DCFR and the PEL in the volume under review, and perhaps
Professor von Bar could have addressed the matter by offering somemore detailed guidance on
these discrepancies, and whether any feature in this volume. It is also confusing that the Oxford
University Press catalogue does very little to explain helpfully the difference between the
DCFR and the PEL volumes, and this can only really be gleaned from reading the Foreword in
the case of the volume under review. Given that the two projects and their publications could
hardly be more intimately related and yet are not identical, this is regrettable. It should also
be explained (though not easily apparent from the book itself or the publisher’s catalogue) that
the books in this series are published simultaneously (but with different ISBN numbers) by
Sellier (Germany), Bruylant (Belgium) and Stämpfli (Switzerland), though it is worth noting
that the Oxford version seems by a significant margin the least expensive. Overall, this volume
is clearly an impressive achievement. The PEL series should help with the important task of
disseminating the DCFR and its commentaries. Moreover, the availability of the individual
PEL volumes will be welcome to those who wish to work from a personal copy in their own
areas of interest and are prepared to pay.
Mark Godfrey
University of Glasgow
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Brian Coote, CONTRACT AS ASSUMPTION
Oxford: Hart Publishing (www.hartpub.co.uk), 2010. xxviii + 217 pp. ISBN 9781849460293.
£29.99.
This work brings together a number of essays on contract law (prefaced by a newly written
introductory chapter) which were previously published by the author as separate journal
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articles between 1964 and 2006. The essays are linked thematically by the central thesis that
contract is best explained as an act by which the contracting parties mutually assume obligations
towards each other. To grasp this thesis the reader could simpy confine him- or herself to
reading chapter 1, where Coote’s theory is fully expounded and differentiated from pre-existing
theories of contract law. However, a reading of the later chapters provides illumination of the
theory within the context of specific aspects of contract law, aspects shown in a new light by
the idea of contract as assumption. The essays included cover a range of topics: the doctrine of
consideration (chs 3-5), exception clauses (ch 6); fundamental breach (ch 7); damages and the
performance interest (ch 8); transferred loss claims and the performance interest (ch 9); third
party rights (ch 10); and assumption of responsibility and pure economic loss in New Zealand
(ch 11), a jurisdiction with which Coote is well familiar, being an emeritus professor of law at
the University of Auckland.
Coote states, by reference to Charles Fried’s famous work, Contract as Promise (1981), that
he “accepts that contracts are made up of promises and that promises involve assumptions of
obligation” (1). However, the focus of Coote’s own work is not, as with Fried’s, the foundation
of contract law upon the morality of promising, but rather upon the idea of the voluntary
assumption of obligations, of which Coote sees promise as merely an expression or form.
Contract law is, for Coote, a facility which parties may choose to use, the liabilites achieved
using this facility not being imposed or incurred but rather intentionally assumed (intention
is a “central requirement” of contract law for Coote, rather than a peripheral matter). The
focus on intention and assumption allows the requirement of consideration to be cast in a
new light by Coote – it is the exchange of mutual assumption of contractual obligation which
is (or at least ought to be, on Coote’s view) the consideration of a contract (3). Coote is not
so radical as to jettison consideration altogether (such reticence arguably resulting in some
problems discussed below), but his equasion of consideration and assumption of responsibility
is radical enough to take Coote’s theory of the Common Law of contract some way towards
that of the other great Western legal families. Lawyers from both “mixed system” and Civil
Law traditions would be likely to recognise more of their own systems in an English contract
law built upon Coote’s theoretical approach than upon traditional Common Law theories. The
Scots lawyer, for instance, would be likely to agree with Coote that the basis of contract law
lies in an assumption of legal duties – such, after all, was Stair’s understanding of the essence
of contract as resting upon the voluntary undertakings of the parties – and the German lawyer
could easily accommodate Coote’s central idea within a Germanic understanding of contract as
based upon the declarations of will (Willenserklärungen) of the parties to the contract.
Coote’s theory leads him to reach a number of conclusions which, for many common
lawyers, will seem radical. In chapter 4, for instance, Coote argues that his theory, dispensing as
it does with a requirement for consideration other than the intention of the parties, would solve
the difficulties which the Common Law traditionally encounters with contractual variations. No
longer would convoluted arguments of the type seen in Williams v Roffey [1991] 1 QB 1 be
required to justify variations to contracts unsupported by traditional forms of consideration:
a clear intention by the parties to undertake an effectual variation of the contract would
suffice, an idea which, Coote explains, the New Zealand courts are already moving towards.
Such a development would be a most welcome one, though I have argued elsewhere that the
more radical step of dispensing entirely with the requirement and language of consideration
would be the simplest and most decisive way of, among other things, enforcing all seriously
intended contractual variations in English law (see Hogg, “Promise: The Neglected Obligation
In European Private Law” (2010) 59 ICLQ 461).
Coote’s central thesis is certainly a breath of fresh air for the Common Law of contract, and
takes a commendable approach to the importance of personal liberty and freedom of action,
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stressing as it does the voluntary intention of the parties as the constitutive means of assuming
an obligation. The thesis also has the attraction of building on what has gone before. Thus,
Coote does not reject out of hand promissory ideas about contract law, but rather suggests that
what is crucial to a legally relevant promise is that the promisor is assuming an obligation in the
act of promising. In so suggesting, however, Coote controversially rejects the idea that promises
are confined to undertakings concerning future acts or abstensions from acting: on his view, one
can make promises about past facts, these being none other than assumptions of obligations
about those past facts (39). Many will feel that this stretches the idea of promise beyond long-
standing and culturally ingrained notions of the institution of promising, the present writer
among them. Contrary to Coote’s view, I argue in a forthcoming work (Promises and Contract
Law, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, 2011) that it is central to the idea of promise
that A is pledging a future performance in favour of B; the assertion of a past or present fact
is per contra a warranty, the making of which, while it may give rise to an obligation, can be
distinguished from a promise.
Given the breadth of time over which the various chapters forming Coote’s book were
originally published in article form (some forty-two years between first and last), the thesis
of contract as assumption inevitably comes over more clearly and in a more developed fashion
in the chapters which were published more recently, reflecting the author’s development as a
thinker. Thus, for instance, in the chapter (on exception clauses) first published in 1964, there
is a much more muted exposition of Coote’s central thesis than one finds in his introductory
chapter, though the message of the chapter – that exception clauses are intentional limitations
on the rights arising at the outset of the contract, rather than mere shields to claims based
on accrued rights – is clearly consistent with a theory of contract as a voluntary assumption of
obligation, and of contracting parties as free agents able to determine which obligations they
assume. Somemight feel that the inclusion of this chapter, written four decades before the later
material, somewhat interrupts the overall flow of the work, given the relatively undeveloped
nature of the central thesis within it; on the other hand, as the work is explicitly a collection of
essays on a theme, the fact that the chapter fits within Coote’s overall theory seems a defensible
reason for its inclusion, and its inclusion can be argued to help demonstrate the development
of Coote’s ideas over the extended period of his academic writing.
Reference was made earlier to Coote’s equivalence between assumption of obligation and
consideration. This allows him to avoid some traditional Common Law problems (such as those
associated with variations of contract unsupported by valid consideration), but the rejection of
the alternative and simpler argument that consideration should be dispensed with altogether
produces some awkward results for Coote’s approach. One such result is Coote’s fondness for
the idea, developed in the Common Law of torts, of an “assumption of responsibility” by a
party as a ground for imposing tortious liability for pure economic loss. Coote’s idea of contract
as based on an assumption of obligation, and the judicial idea of a tortious assumption of
responsibility, have evident parallels. To most this would be worrying, as an acceptance of the
validity of both Coote’s thesis as well as of the idea of assumption of responsibility in tort must
lead inevitably to a blurring or merger of contract and parts of tort. Coote acknowledges that
the idea that tortious liability can be assumed voluntarily “may appear counter-intuitive” (193),
as indeed it does, but he nonetheless defends the idea rather than attack it (as the present
writer would have). Why? Because, Coote argues, it allows tort law to fill gaps in the Common
Law resulting from the doctrine of privity of contract, something which “might even lead to
the eventual development of what, in effect, if not in theory, would be a new form of contract
for which consideration was unnecessary” (203). This is a worrying defence of assumption of
responsibility in tort: rather than simply argue for the abolition of consideration as a formal
requirement of contract law, thus allowing all seriously intended voluntary undertakings to
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constitute contracts rather than force them into the tort box, Coote has instead led himself
into defending a blurring of the fundamental division between voluntary and involuntary
obligations in order to try and work round the problems caused by a consideration requirement.
Despite promising signs of a willingness to embrace fully the radical agenda of contract as
assumption, in the end he seems unable fully to throw off the shackles of consideration. The
result is an endorsement of the distorted solutions the Common Law employed to deal with
the unwelcome results of a doctrine of consideration that Coote might so easily have jettisoned
when advancing his new theory of contract.
There is much to commend in this work. The idea of contract as assumption is an attractive
one, not least of all because it can accommodate the notion of promise (though not all would
agree in precisely the way defined by Coote) as a means to effect such assumption, as well
because it supports personal freedom and responsibility, values much underplayed in contract
theory in the 1970s and 1980s. If Coote’s thesis has a principal weakness, it has been argued to
be that it is not radical enough. Coote clings to consideration, albeit in a recast form, when a
theory focusing on seriously intended assumption of obligation is surely one in which the idea
of consideration is superfluous. Consideration appears to offer nothing of use to contract theory
once the focus has rightly been found in the serious intentions of the parties to be bound to
an obligation. It may be that Coote’s view is that an outright rejection of consideration would
simply be too radical, and that for any contract theory to stand a chance of receiving judicial
approbation it must at least attempt to meet the courts half way. If that is so, it is a pity; the
elegance of Coote’s theory is somewhat distorted by the need to accommodate consideration
within it, and to argue that consideration ought to be abolished would hardly be the shocking
argument that it once may have been. Despite this arguable weakness, this collection of essays
remains a stimulating and worthwhile read. Its publication serves as a reminder that there are
those within Common Law academic circles willing to think radically about contract theory, in
ways which offer the genuine possibility of fashioning a theory which might serve not just the
Common Law but the other legal families also.
Martin Hogg
University of Edinburgh
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Catharine MacMillan, MISTAKES IN CONTRACT LAW
Oxford: Hart Publishing (www.hartpub.co.uk), 2010. xxv + 322 pp. ISBN 9781841135076. £50.
The doctrine of mistake continues to perplex, frustrate and fascinate contract lawyers in equal
measure. When, in Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2003]
QB 679, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Phillips, was driven to remark that “[i]t has been a
fertile source of academic debate, but in practice it has given rise to a handful of cases that
have merely emphasised the confusion of this area of our jurisprudence” (at 725), he could
have been talking about the doctrine of mistake more generally and not just the distinction
between common mistake in Law and Equity. Catherine MacMillan seeks to address some of
these problems or, as she puts it, why “the form of the common law doctrine of mistake is itself
largely a mistake” (2) by taking a long view. The doctrine of mistake in its modern form was a
Victorian invention. But it was one with a complex pedigree.
MacMillan begins the story of mistake in Ancient Rome with enough contextual information
to be accessible to readers without any grounding in Roman law. The tale is continued through
the Glossators, Neo-Scholastics and finally the Natural lawyers. Chapter 2 concentrates on
